There were no surprises in Arsene Wenger’s team selection and, thankfully, there were none on the pitch either. It wasn’t a perfect game from the Gunners but an eight minute spell of exceptional efficiency and clinical finishing settled the game midway through the second half.
It followed patterns that we’ve seen in many recent games so I won’t dwell on them. Arsenal controlled the opening exchanges and dictated the tempo early on. But they didn’t really convert that into quality chances and the goal came from an unexpected source, a corner. Wigan’s defending was terrible and will probably be identified as the chief reason of their troubles this season. In most other Arsenal games, I’ve seen such corners gobbled up by the Keeper or easily header clear by the defenders. Balls put in so close to the goal have rarely troubled the opponents leave alone result in goals.
In this game it came all the way to Podolski who was left unmarked. The German showed good composure even when the manner of scoring was not his speciality. How many headers has he scored in his entire career?
The hosts slowly relinquished control over the tie after the goal. Wigan started seeing a lot more of the ball in advanced territories from midway through the first half to the end. But Wenger’s team remained defensively compact and dealt with any danger. Szczesny was largely untroubled.
Only that one ball over the top of the defence comes to mind but Koscielny found a way to clear the threat.
I thought Arsenal were defending with a clear 4-1-4-1 shape which seemed a change from their usual approach as Arteta sat really deep in midfield just in front of the defence whereas the other midfielders formed a line a few yards in front of him.
The Spaniard’s positioning meant it was difficult for Wigan to build anything through the middle and Kone’s influence was minimized as he can drop deep to receive the ball and hold play while other join in.
The discipline of the four in front of him and structural integrity achieved through that also limited openings for Wigan to exploit. It’s worth noting that the visitors actually had more possession, played more passes, and had greater passing accuracy than the hosts, but they couldn’t create many chances.
Their goal came from a soft free-kick. I’m sure Arsene would have complained about it if points had been dropped. Maloney’s strike was superb but I was surprised Podolski didn’t jump. I’d think the wall needs greatest height at the far end where the goalkeeper would find it hardest to cover. Anyway, that’s one for the coaches to analyze.
Wigan came out with greater purpose in the second half as if their late equalizer had instilled genuine belief. Kone had their best chance early in the second period when a seemingly fortuitous one-two put him through. Szczesny did well to close the angle and made a convincing save.
Arsenal were not really getting control of the ball or territory in the second period but they started exploiting the space behind Wigan’s defence, particularly with attacks originating down the right side behind Espinoza.
First, Walcott fed Cazorla who couldn’t score with two good attempts, probably the only blot on his otherwise impeccable worksheet for the day. Then Rosicky played Theo in behind but he could not find enough power or precision with his shot after choosing to ignore Podolski’s run that was marked well by Boyce.
Soon after, the Gunners did take the lead. This time it was Cazorla making a run down the right. It’s worth noting the interchange of positions between the players as Theo had gone central with Podolski wide on the left. Arsenal played eight passes in the build-up to that goal and stretched the play horizontally before going vertical. Nonetheless, it was again terrible defending and goalkeeping that cost the visitors.
If that was bad defending, very little should be said about the mess they created for the third. Szczesny’s long ball was headed into the danger area by Alcaraz. Meanwhile, Scharner had dropped a good five yards deeper despite no Arsenal player making a run. Cazorla’s header was deftly cushioned but completely unchallenged. In the same manner, Podolski’s clip was predatory and superbly executed but way too easy for this level.
The fourth came from a simple ball down the left flank that caught the entire Wigan defence unawares. Espinoza played Ramsey onside. The Welshman’s finish was emphatic and brilliantly disguised.
The Gunners could then relax as the visitors had lost their appetite for the fight they were clearly losing.
All teams face the problem of balance. Wigan have troubled the Gunners when they’ve been able to defend deep for long periods. I was surprised they opened up so soon in this game. Playing it tight and throwing everything forward in the last 10 minutes would have been a much better tactic for them. Their confidence in the second half proved their undoing. Kone’s missed chance was also vital. At 1-2 up they could have reverted to a deep defence and might have shut the Gunners out as they did last season.
That Arsenal conceded was not a surprise, but I was impressed by the way they limited the visitors’ chances despite conceding possession. The team’s defensive shape and the choices made by individuals was commendable. As was the manner in which they covered for each other. There were times when I saw the likes of Gibbs and Walcott pop up deep in the Arsenal penalty box on the right side to make tackles and recoveries. A good defence has to be a team effort and the Gunners seem to be improving slowly but steadily.
Individual Performances:
Szczesny: Don’t know if the coaches will fault him for the shape and positioning of the wall. Good save from Kone. Distribution was average.
Sagna: Most of Arsenal’s threats came down the right and the Frenchman played a good unobtrusive supporting role as he was there to help but stayed out of the way of the creative players. Had very little to do defensively in the first half as Wigan focussed on the other flank. Received useful cover from teammates in the second.
Mertesacker: Made some important tackles around the edge of the box and his positioning was consistently good. His only mistake was probably the occasion he went to ground to make an interception near the centre line. It opened space up for Wigan and resulted in McCarthy’s goal that was just marginally off-side. Didn’t see as much of the ball as he usually does because the Gunners conceded possession.
Koscielny: Made a couple of big interventions in the box. Should probably have scored from the corner that fell to him invitingly. Steady game on the whole.
Gibbs: Did a good job on McManaman and kept Wigan’s most creative player quiet. Passing wasn’t as reliable as Arsene would want from his full-back and made a very limited contribution in the attacking areas.
The back five had a good game without being spectacular, but they didn’t really have to produce anything special. The team defended as a unit and they remained well protected for most of the game.
Arteta: Gave away some fouls, one of which resulted in the Wigan goal, but you could wonder if another referee would have called those. Passing was below par but it was his positioning and tendency to drop back into the defensive line which often plugged crucial holes and forced play away from the danger zones.
Rosicky: Showed good energy, particularly early on. Defensive contribution was noteworthy from a discipline point of view as he protected some central areas that Wigan seem to favour. The quick turn and through-ball for Walcott was the most eye-catching moment of the game for me.
Ramsey: Here, there, everywhere, and pretty effective. Saw a lot of the ball and made telling contributions at both ends of the pitch. Took his goal really well while constantly looking/faking to cut the ball back.
Cazorla: Four assists! And different ones too. I wonder if he’s ever picked up an assist with his head before. Was a constant source of inspiration for the Gunners that turned lethal once Wigan pushed up and lost control over their shape and distances. Defensive work rate on the left was also exceptional and he helped deal with McManaman (Is it a coincidence that Arsenal picked up three quick goals soon after the youngster was taken off?). MotM in my opinion.
Walcott: Picked his moments to move inside carefully and stayed wide often to exploit the space available. This Wigan defence, particularly in the second half, was perfect for him as they were wide open with huge gaps between the lines and individuals. Credit to him for using the opportunity as he linked well with Cazorla and Rosicky. Converted his chance without a fuss, even if there was an element of luck to it. Defensive contribution deserves a mention.
I thought the midfield deserves bulk of the credit for this win not only because of their contribution to the goals but also for their effort in front of the defence. A while back it wouldn’t have been hard to imagine this Wigan side playing one-twos and constantly exploiting the gaps in front and behind the defence. In this game the midfielders cut out almost any opportunity for the visitors to develop their combinations and thus left the back four with a very manageable task.
Podolski: Took both his goals really well to reaffirm his status as the best finisher at the club. Still far from his best in this role but the goals should help his confidence and that of his teammates. His horizontal movement was good and he often dropped back to add bodies in the middle.
Subs: They came on after the game was virtually over.
Wenger: Should be pleased with this win. The performance was far from ideal but it carries some encouraging trends forward. The team certainly looks much more balanced than it did at the start of the season. However, one big test still remains before any real plaudits can be handed out.
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Posted by desigunner 
The Key To Bayern’s Emphatic Triumph Over Barcelona
May 3, 2013For many it’s the end of an era and a number of observers have witnessed a change of guard at the top of European football. There are also those who wish to be more patient and see how the vanquished respond. Whether you belong to one of these categories or have an entirely different view, one thing is for certain, Bayern’s sheer dominance over Barcelona over two legs and the nature of their wins have given everyone some food for thought.
Few would have predicted the Germans will win both legs when the draw was made. I doubt even the proudest, most passionate of Bavarian fans would have expected their team to knock seven past Valdes without Neuer picking the ball out of his net even once. Something extraordinary has happened here.
I am sure by now you must have read a fair number of reports/analyses from different perspectives. Messi’s injury has obviously been a big factor. Vilanova’s long term absence due to his serious illness must surely have had an impact on the Barcelona squad given the fact that he was palpably, even if cautiously and slowly, trying to shift the team’s approach from the constant high intensity pressing we’d become accustomed to in the Guardiola reign. The lack of depth in the Catalan ranks, particularly in the centre of defence, is another valid reason. Key players might also be tired, mentally and physically, after years of consistency at the very top.
Of course, we must be careful not to dilute Bayern’s brilliance by listing Barcelona’s problems. The Germans were stronger, sharper, and smarter. They had clear ideas – for instance, the use of set-pieces and aerial strength in the box – and executed them excellently. Heynckes’ team have deservedly received praise for their pressing, organization, discipline, work ethic, counter-attacking, and other attributes.
I don’t want to go over these things again as many excellent writers have covered these in a manner beyond my current abilities. However, I do want to explore one particular angle that I found very interesting. It’s a very specific territorial battle that Bayern won in both games and thus denied Barcelona the chance to impose their trademark suffocating grip on the game.
Before I get into what Bayern did, allow me to note certain characteristics of Barcelona’s style that has made them one of the best club sides ever put together.
It is said that the defending side should try to make the pitch as small as possible while the attacking team should stretch the play. It’s widely accepted wisdom but sometimes we forget that the process of compressing the playing area and that of stretching it are physical acts where the players have to move around on the pitch and it takes time. And teams are often very vulnerable when they’re doing this because a quick transition can catch many players out of position.
Barcelona, in my opinion, have a very unique solution to this as they compress play and stretch it at the same time. By basing their game on a short passing style and by insisting that the man on the ball be always provided with multiple passing options, the Catalans ensure that they always have a number of bodies around the ball. At the same time, at least one wide player and/or their full-backs consistently offers width up the pitch.
The ability to understand and minimize the risk taken in possession has been a key to its successful execution and patience has been a vital attribute. As a result, when Barcelona did lose the ball they often had enough players who could immediately press as a unit and win the ball back within a matter of seconds (6 second rule?). Not only was the man on the ball put under pressure by two or three opponents, his passing options would be cut off by other Barcelona players who read the situations and swarmed in accordingly.
The team’s shape played a crucial part in bringing the excellent tactical ideas to fruition on the pitch. Once the team settled into its rhythm after the initial exchanges, we’d see the central defenders on the half-way line, Busquets a few yards in front of them moving into carefully judged spaces to keep the ball rolling, Xavi would be around him again creating and using space, Messi would drop deep or move across horizontally till he got a chance to run at the defence or play someone else in behind. The wider players played their part making intelligently timed diagonal/vertical runs or by holding their positions or by cutting inside.
The above is, without a doubt, a very simplified version of their tactics but it should rekindle memories of the patterns of play when Barcelona dominated games.
In order for these tactics to succeed there is a very specific area of the pitch that Barcelona have to control. Take a look at the following chart of their passes against Milan in the 4-0 win at the Camp Nou in the previous round.
It’s impossible to make sense of individual passes from that chart but we don’t need to. The density of passes is important. Most of it is just inside the Milan half. That’s the area where Barca set up their base camp before launching attacks. It’s the perfect territory for the likes of Xavi and Busquets to control possession and dictate the tempo.
This is so because they need to stay at an ideal (short) distance from the central defenders who have to be on the centre line. Opposition strikers can be on the halfway line without being offside so no team would want to push its key defenders further forward during open play unless absolutely necessary.
If the midfield pushed too far forward they’d be away from their defenders and into the opposition ranks in front of their penalty box. That’s not the right place for controlling possession because the risk of losing the ball would be very high, as would be the gap between their own lines which would make controlling transitions much harder.
If they stayed deeper and pushed the central defenders further back, the team would be farther from the opposition box/goal and closer to its own penalty area and goal. Again it wouldn’t be ideal. In fact, Bayern succeeded in pushing them back but I’ll come to that in a bit.
You could call that purple box, although an approximation, the control room for the suffocating Barcelona system. Attacks are built from there with carefully picked moments of penetration and all the players form layers around the ball. An attacking player might want to pass it back and Busquets or Xavi would be available to receive it. Behind them would be the layer of central defenders and even Valdes could receive a pass if the opponents got too close. Similarly, there would be midfielders available for sideways passes and beyond them, right on the flanks, either a full-back or a winger would be waiting. This layering also helped control transitions by quickly pressing the man on the ball and the first layer of options around him.
What Bayern did, through superior physicality, immaculate organization, and astute decision making, was to wrest control of this vital piece of territory.
The following chart compares passes made by Barcelona against the Germans in the two legs.
The density of passing remains a very good indicator of where all the action was. The control room is sparsely populated. Barcelona had more possession deeper in their own half.
In his insightful match report for his Zonal Marking website, Michael Cox made the following observation,
Barcelona’s most frequent passing combination was Marc Bartra to Gerard Pique – a move that happened 21 times.
He went on to add,
The ball spent too long at the back, and Barcelona never picked up the tempo and piled on the pressure on the Bayern defence.
Cox ascribes this problem (partly?) to Song’s inability to link the defence with the creative players in a manner that Busquets typically does,
…Song wasn’t disastrous in the holding role, but he lacks Busquets’ positional discipline and understanding of how to let the play flow naturally through him, and up towards the creative players.
But it’s worth noting that in the reverse fixture Barca had the same problem even with Busquets in the starting line up. Refer to the passing density above and the fact that their most common passing combination in that game was Alba to Iniesta with 22 passes on the flank followed closely by, you guessed it, Bartra to Pique at 21 passes.
Against Milan, who sat back, Busquets to Xavi and Xavi to Iniesta were the most common passing combinations, and many of those passes were in the control room area discussed above.
Whereas most of the Bartra to Pique passes were almost all 10-20 yards inside the Barcelona half in both the games.
Against Milan, Barcelona completed 626 of their 715 attempted passes. In Munich, they completed 603 out of 666. The number or accuracy of passes is not very different. In no way does it explain how Vilanova’s side won the former game by 4 goals to nil while losing the latter with the same margin. But the positioning of those passes is more telling.
A few things happened as a result of Bayern successfully pushing Barcelona’s chief possession zone back by 20-25 yards.
1) Barcelona were further away from the Bayern goal and it was harder for them to bring their attackers into play. They were stretched vertically. This reduced the total number of attacks that the Spanish side could mount as well as the quality of the ones they did put together. Remember, they don’t like to play a direct vertical game.
2) The Catalans were never able to get into the siege mode – a shape where they could collectively and effectively suffocate the Germans once they lost the ball – because their spacing was no longer as required for that kind of pressing. Consequently, they could not really press as a unit, particularly higher up the pitch. This was another observation that Cox made in his analysis,
…while Barcelona’s sheer stamina in their pressing was frequently praised under Guardiola, less attention was played to the actual positioning and cohesion in the pressing – the player in possession wasn’t just closed down, all his other passing options were pressured too. Here, Barcelona’s ‘pressing’ seemed simply more like frantic chasing with other opponents left free.
3) As a result of 1 and 2, Bayern were able to hold on to the ball when Barcelona lost it (for longer than 6 seconds!), remained relatively safe at the back, and were always a threat on counters. On the other hand, Vilanova’s side could no longer remain patient in possession in deeper areas, and their attempts to bring attackers into play were down to riskier passes that resulted in threatening transitions which could not be prevented by hard pressing as their shape was lost.
It’s difficult to say just what percentage of that territorial battle was won by Bayern and what was lost by Barcelona. Surely, a fully fit Messi would have had a bigger say in that battle. But I’ve seen Real Madrid trouble their Catalan rivals in recent games through similar tactics by contesting that zone with some success, so I’m inclined to believe this is one of Barcelona’s (the possession game’s) genuine weaknesses and the Germans did well to exploit that.
Heynckes’ team did that by constant and clever pressing. They never went overboard but consistently marked the key players. When they had to leave someone free it was usually the central defenders. Ergo the Bartra to Pique combination discussed above.
Their man-marking was flawless but, equally, the players also picked the right moments and positions to let their man go and hand him over to a teammate. Most teams struggle at this against Barcelona because their movement pulls opponents apart and creates gaps in the defensive fabric. Bayern rarely yielded a yard of space, and never for a period long enough to be expensive.
Mandzukic in this game, and Gomez in the previous one, often left the central defenders and dropped back onto the deepest midfielder. This gave them an extra body in midfield which was useful in dealing with Messi or Fabregas when they dropped deep. In turn, the Bayern central defenders were rarely pulled out of position.
Furthermore, the discipline and work rate of usually attack-minded players like Ribery and Robben was praiseworthy. They often played as auxiliary full-backs when Barca did get the chance to move forward. It allowed Lahm and Alaba the luxury of staying relatively compact alongside their central defenders. Bayern’s backline maintained excellent spacing for most of the 180 minutes.
An interesting side note
Although further observations and analysis is needed on this, I get a feeling people within German football have identified the aforementioned piece of real estate on the football pitch as the key to finding the right balance between attack and defence.
Observe the density of passes made by Arsenal in home games against Schalke and Bayern, both of which the Gunners lost despite dominating possession.
Seems consistent with the discussion above, doesn’t it?
Dortmund topped their group of death but had less possession than their opponents in all six group games. Away to City and Ajax for instance, the Germans did an excellent job of defending that space just inside their own half.
While Barcelona and other possession based sides like to control that central zone just inside the opposition half from an offensive point of view, the Germans have shown that proactively defending that zone can lead to superb balance between attack and defence.
Many teams concede that zone when facing technically dominant sides. Indeed, Chelsea and Inter have won the Champions League by parking the bus, so to speak. But it’s worth noting that they both ended up in the Europa League this season. Defending deep and hoping for chances on the counter-attack can work in the short term but it is rarely going to be a strategy that works over a long period of time, not to mention the sheer drudgery needed to survive in each game.
The German approach, on the other hand, provides greater tactical control over games and the team with lower possession can often create more meaningful chances and look like the better attacking unit!
Defending with the first line of players around the centre line or pressing the first ball out from defence is not a revolutionary tactic. But we must also remember that Guardiola didn’t invent short passing, pressing, through-balls, or a clever dink over the top. He found a way to put it all together meticulously in a system that suited the strengths of his players to a tee. The beauty was in the minor details and flawless execution time and time again.
Similarly, it’s not that Heynckes, or Klopp, or other managers in the German system have created a novel tactical approach. But they seem to have refined it to a level where it could indeed create the new world order in football. I am possessed by that thought, do you have a counter?
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